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in applying a general statutory provision to a particular set of facts. An administrative decision which is both rational and supported by substantial evidence
should not be upset merely because it is not based upon traditional precedents or
specific legislative provisions.
Appeal and Error-Appealable Interest-Right of Landlord Not Party to
Dram Shop Proceeding to Prosecute Appeal-[llinois].-The plaintiff was injured in a tavern by the acts of an intoxicated person. Section I4 of the Illinois
Liquor Control Act, gives to the party injured in such circumstances the right
to sue the tavern keeper and property owner separately or jointly. The plaintiff
elected to sue only the tavern keeper, and he obtained a judgment. Pursuant to
Section 15 of the Liquor Control Act,2 the plaintiff then sued to subject the
building in which the tavern was located to the payment of the judgment. The
owners, non-residents, had that action removed to the federal district court,
where it is now pending, and filed a petition with the Illinois appellate court for
leave to appeal the original judgment. The appellate court dismissed this appeal on the plaintiff's motion.3 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court of the
appellate court's dismissal of the property owners' petition to appeal the original judgment, held, the property owners have no appealable interest in the
4
original judgment. Judgment affirmed. Gibbons v. Cannaven.
At common law the only mode of removing a cause from an inferior court to
a superior court was by writ of error.5 The writ of error was available to anyone who was a party to the record, was injured by the judgment, would be
benefited by a reversal, or was competent to release errors. 6 An additional method
of review under certain restrictions, the right of appeal, was created by statute.7
Prior to the Civil Practice Act, under Illinois statutes, a person not a party to
the record could not maintain an appeal, 8 although he might have been able to
do so under the writ of error. Section 8i of the Civil Practice Act'eliminated the
distinction between the writ of error and the right of appeal.9 This merger
*III. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 43, § 135.
111. Rev. Stat. (I945) c. 43, § 136.
3Gibbons v. Cannaven, 325 Ill. App. 337, 6o N.E. 2d 254 (,945).
4.393 Il. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370 (1946).
s Bowers v. Green, 2 Ill. 42 (1832).
6 People v. Whealan, 353 Il. 500, 187 N.E. 491 (i933); White Brass Castings Co. v.
Union Metal Mfg. Co., 232 Ill. i65, 83 N.E. 540 (i9O8); People v. Harrigan's Estate, 294 Ill.
171, 128 N.E. 334 (1920); People v. Lowrer, 254 111. 306, 98 N.E. 557 (1912); People v. O'Connell, 252 111. 304, 96 N.E. zoo8 (191i).
7 Veach v. Hendricks, 278 111. App. 376 (I935).
8People v. Franklin County Bldg. Ass'n, 329 Ill. 582, 161 N.E. 56 (1928); National Bank
v. Barth, 179 Ill. 83, 53 N.E. 615 (1899).
9Ill. Rev. Stat. (I945) C. 110, § 205. "The right heretofore possessed by any person not a
party to the record to review a judgment or decree by writ of error shall be preserved by notice
of appeal."
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brought the common law limitations of the writ of error into the realm of the
appeal.
Under the writ of error, the Illinois courts adopted a narrow interpretation
in deciding whether one not a party to the record was injured by the judgment
or would benefit by a reversal."' The doctrine was limited to cases wherein the
record indicated prejudice by the judgment.- Where a judgment granting,
among other things, lawyer's fees, was reversed, the lawyer was given leave to
sue out a writ of error.1 2 An executrix was permitted to review a judgment
against the decedent,1 3 and legatees were allowed to bring a writ of error to review a judgment of the circuit court dismissing their appeal from an order of
the probate court allowing a claim for unpaid taxes against the estate.' 4 Easing
the rule, the court in People v. Harrigan's held that if a party's interest was not
apparent on the record, it must be alleged in the assignment of errors.
Since the passage of the Practice Act, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
the same requirements must be met by a party not of record who seeks an appeal
as was necessary under the writ: of error-that he has been injured by the judgment or will benefit by a reversal.' 6 The court in People v. Kennedy' 7 said,
"Before he [one not a party to the record] can successfully prosecute an appeal
his interest in the suit must appear in the transcript of the record or be alleged
in the points relied upon for reversal. A notice of appeal is a part of the record."
Despite this apparent liberality the courts seem to be limiting the right to
appeal of persons not parties to the record to those whose interest in the judgment appears on the face of the record of the original action or whose interest
can be reasonably inferred from the record without resort to outside evidence.' 8
o
z" In Leland v. Leland, 319 Ill. 426, 25 N.E. 270 (1926), a correspondent in a divorce suit
was refused the right to sue out a writ of error to review the decree granting the divorce,
notwithstanding the effect of the decree on the reputation of the correspondent; in White
Brass Castings Co. v. Union Metal Mfg. Co., 232 Ill. 165, 83 N.E. 54o (x9o8), stockholders
were held unable to prosecute a writ of error to reverse a judgment against the corporation.

"1White Brass Castings Co. v. Union Metal Mfg. Co.,
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Ill. 65, 83 N.E. 540 (19o8).

Anderson v. Stegar, 173 Ill. 22, 50 N.E. 665 (i898).
13 Moll v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 228 Il. 633, 81 N.E. 1147 (1907).
14 People v. Harrigan's Estate, 294 11. 171, 228 N.E. 334 (1920). In People v. Whealan,
353 Ill. 500, 187 N.E. 491 (i933), the court held that where county officers are required by
mandamus to issue and pay warrants on the county treasury for salary claimed by a county
employee, the county, although not a party to the record, was permitted to prosecute a writ of
error to the Illinois Supreme Court.
'S

294 Ill. 171,

228

N.E. 334

(1920).

' Hotchkiss v. Calumet City, 377 Il. 615, 37 N.E. 2d 332 (1941); Lenhart v. Miller, 375
Ill. 346,31 N.E. 2d 782 (i94o); People v. Kennedy, 367 Ill. 236, io N.E. 2d 8o6 (i937).
X7,367 fI1. 236, io N.E. 2d 8o6 (2937).
is In the Kennedy case landowners were granted leave to appeal a decision granting mandamus commanding the annexation of their territory for school land, but in People v. City
of Peoria, 378 Ill. 572, 39 N.E. 2d 42 (194r), neighboring property owners were unsuccessful
in their attempt to appeal from a judgment awarding mandamus for a building permit.
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Lending support to this inference is the expressed corollary that a party not of
recoid must have a direct interest in the subjecf matter of the litigation which
is prejudiced by the judgment before 'he can maintain an appeal.'9 Dicta in
Almon v. American CarloadingCorp.20 restrict the right to appeal to cases wherein his interest is one which is attached to the judgment or decree that is entered
on the merits of the controversy.
In holding that the property owners in the instant case did not have an
appealable interest the court has departed from the line of decisions which have
held that a party not of record could maintain an appeal if he could show a
direct interest in the judgment or that he would benefit by a reversal. Although
the court has cited this standard for appeal with approval," it has nevertheless
held that here the property owners had no direct interest in the original judgment despite the fact that the same statute which gave the plaintiff a cause of
action against the tavern keeper also gave the plaintiff the right to satisfy any
judgment obtained in that action against the property owners. It is difficult to
call the property owners' interest anything less than direct when it is so probable
that the plaintiff will be forced to collect the judgment from the property owners
because of the inability of tavern keepers as a class to meet such judgments.
It has been held that in the subsequent action on the original judgment the
property owners' defense will be limited to denying (i) the existence of the judgment or that any part of it remains unpaid, (2) that a lease was made for the
use of the premises as a tavern, or (3) that if a lease was not made for the use of
the premises as a tavern, that it was so used with the property pwners' knowledge.23 In the original action are settled, then, the most frequently disputed
issues of whether the injury was caused by a person who became intoxicated in
the tavern on the property owners' premises, the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, the existence of acts by the plaintiff contributing to the intoxication of
the tortfeasor,24 and the existence of a provocation of the assault. s It is apparent, therefore, that the property owners' liability is ordinarily settled in the
26
original judgment.
'9 American Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 fll. 222, 5i'N.E. 2d 122 (1943). Yet in Scott v. Great
Western Coal Co., 223 Ill. 271, 79 N.E. 53 (i9o6), the court in determining who could sue out
a writ of error said that "he must have some direct or collateral interest injuriously affected
by the judgment upon which he can rest a right to a review."

20380 I1. 524, 44 N.E. 2d 592 (1942).
21Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370, 372 (1946).
The judgment obtained against the tavern keeper in the original suit was
23

Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97 (9918).

'4

Bowman v. O'Brien, 3o3 Ill. App. 630,

2s Pearson v. Reufro, 320 Ill. App.
App. 406, 53 N.E. 2d 307 (1944).

25 N.E. 2d

202, 5o

$12,000.

544 (i94o).

N.E. 2d 598 (i943); Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill

26 The position of the landowner in situations similar to that in the instant case has been
compared to that of a surety. Garrity v. Eiger, 272 Il. 127, III N.E. 735 (r916); cf. Hardten
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The court reached the result in the instant case by apparently confusing the
requirements of Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and Sections 14 and 15 of
the Liquor Control Act. It is obvious that the property owners have a direct
interest in the original judgment and will be benefited by a reversal, since that
judgment is the basis upon which the plaintiff will maintain his action against
them in the suit now pending in the federal district court. Hence it would appear that the property owners have qualified under Section 8i of the Civil
Practice Act27 What the court has actually held is that, despite this showing by
the property owners, they are prohibited from making this appeal because Section 14 of the Liquor Control Act gives the plaintiff three distinct remedies, and
to allow the property owners to appeal a judgment obtained against the tavern
keeper alone would frustrate one of the remedies which the legislature has given
the plaintiff-the right to sue only the tavern keeper.28 This interpretation of
Sections 14 and I5 of the Liquor Control Act places the property owner in an
almost helpless position. He cannot intervene in the original action against the
tavern keeper, 29 he cannot appeal a decision against the tavern keeper, and
when he is sued on that judgment, he cannot question the merits.
The court answered the obvious due-process objection by quoting extensively
from both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court
opinions in Eiger v. Garrity,30 a case which upheld the constitutionality of the
provision in the Dram Shop Act subjecting a property owner to the payment of
a judgment against that tavern keeper and refused to permit the tavern keeper
to attack the original judgment collaterally. Since it was constitutional to attach
liability to the property owner for injuries caused in a tavern on his premises
and since the United States Supreme Court applied a basic procedural rule and
refused to permit a collateral attack on a judgment, the Illinois court in the
v. State, 32 Kan. 637, 5 Pac. 212 (1884). In other situations a surety has been held to have
sufficient interest to appeal. Weer v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490 (1878); cf. Belchoir v. Branch, ii R.I.
266 (1875); Garber v. Commonwealth, 7 Pa. 265 (1847). The position of the tavern keeper
has also been compared to that of an agent for the landowner. Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S.
97 (1918). This analogy should likewise lead to the conclusion that the landowner's interest
is sufficiently direct to permit him to appeal.
27Note 6 supra.
28The court presented a further argument against the appealable interest of the property
owners based upon the procedural difficulties which would result if the appeal were allowed
and were successful. Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370, 377-78 (1946). The
same difficulties are presented when any person not party to the record is granted leave to
appeal. Carried to its conclusion, this argument would result in nullifying that part of Section
8i of the Civil Practice Act which permits persons not party to the record to appeal.
29The court specifically rejected the possibility of intervention. Supporting this conclusion is the argument that the property owner's interest is too remote when the original
action is in progress to permit intervention. The plaintiff might fail to obtain a judgment
against the tavern keeper, or should he succeed, he may collect the full amount from the
tavern keeper.
30

246 U.S. 97 (x918), affirming 272 Ill. 127, iir N.E. 735 (i926).
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instant case concluded that it does not violate due process to prohibit property
owners from attacking the judgment by intervention or appeal-an issue not
directly involved in the Eiger case.
The Eiger case recognized that the right to deal in intoxicating liquors is a
privilege and that prohibition, regulation, and restraint of the sale and manufacture of liquor is justified by the police power of the state. That case recognized that it was in the public interest to place liability on landlords for any
harm caused by persons becoming intoxicated in taverns located on the landlord's premises. This insures an injured person that he will be able to recover
from a financially responsible person any damages he may be awarded, and
centralizes the risk in those in the best position to pay the cost. The landlord can
insure himself against any possible liability and pass the cost of the insurance
on to the tavern keeper in the form of rent. The tavern keeper, in turn, can pass
this cost on to the liquor consumers, thereby placing the ultimate burden on the
group primarily responsible for the harm which has been caused to innocent
persons.
The liability which the statute imposes does not require that the property
owners be denied the opportunity to contest the extent of the harm, or to contest whether the tort is one which arose from their premises. Short of actual
fraud or collusion, which the court implicitly recognizes as a defense t6 the
property owners, 31 there are many ways in which the liability of the property
owners may be much greater than if they had been permitted to conduct the
defense. Their liability should not depend on the degree of enthusiasm with
which the tavern keeper defends the original action. Basic notions of justice
require that those who must pay should be given the opportunity to defend.
Bankruptcy-Railroad Reorganizations-Confirmation of Plan under
Section 77 over Vote of Dissenting Class of Creditors-[United States].The debtor railroad filed a petition in a United States district court on Nov. i,
1935, for reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act., Trustees
were appointed and during the ensuing decade four different reorganization
plans were submitted to the district court by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The first three plans were disapproved by that court; the last, which was
under consideration here, was approved in October, 1943.2 This plan reduced
the capitalization of the railroad ifrom about 200 million to about 143 million
dollars and allocated to the old senior secured creditors the entire issue of new
bonds and approximately 88 per cent of the new common stock, which combination at par equalled the face value of their claims plus accrued interest. Junior
,secured creditors were allocated the balance of the new common stock, at par
31Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370, 378 (1946).
149 Stat. 9i1 (1935), ii U.S.C.A. § 205 (x946).
In re Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., C. C. H. Bkcy. L. Serv. 54,562 (D.C.
Colo., 1943). The details of the plan are reported in Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. Reorg.,
254 I.C.C. 349 (1943)-

